Abstract -The quantity of malicious artifacts (malware) generated by the combination of unique attack goals, unique targets and various tools available for the developers, demands the automation of prospecting and analysis of said artifacts. Considering the fact that one problem handled by experts in analysis of executable code is packing, this paper presents a method of packing detection through the appliance of statistical and information theory metrics. The tool developed in this study, called BinStat, generated a high recognition rate of executable packing status within the test samples, proving its effectiveness.
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I. IntroductIon
With the advent of the Internet and the resulting offering of sensitive online services, the action of malicious artifacts was raised to a new level. The breach of data confidentiality became more widely persecuted for its financial potential gain. The complexity of those artifacts follows the trend of growth of available online services, through the application of more refined techniques of attack and obfuscation.
A sector greatly affected by criminal activity is that of online banking. Data presented by [1] indicates that in 2009, the Brazilian banks losses from online fraud reached the figure of nine hundred million dollars. Moreover, [2] says that Brazil is a major source of malicious artifacts of trojan type aiming at internet banking activity. Corroborating this idea of brazilian leadership in malware production, [3] presents data that points Brazil as the source of four percent of all new malicious artifacts captured in the world.
Migrating from public to private sector, one can observe an intense movement of the major world powers in order to build safeguards against cyber attacks aimed at critical national infrastructure. The raise of the worm Stuxnet which, according to [4] , [5] and [6] was developed with the specific intention of maiming Iran's nuclear program as its target was the embedded control components of nuclear centrifuges, was considered by many information security experts as cyber war´s first movement.
The quantity of malware generated by the combination of unique attack goals, unique targets and various tools available for the developers, demands the automation of prospecting and analysis of said artifacts. Thus, the development of tools that extract information from all stages of executable analysis be it static or dynamic becomes essential.
One type of tool that can be used by developers is the Packer. These may, in addition to obfuscate the source code from an executable, reduce its size. Therefore, developers can use them with the legitimate purposes of reducing the space occupied by a program as well as safeguarding their intellectual property.
However, regarding the development of malware, packers are used in order to circumvent the mechanisms of recognition on signatures based antivirus and hinder or prevent access to malware source code, employing various methods such as multi-layered packing and anti-unpacking techniques: anti-dumping, anti-emulating and anti-debugging [7] .
So one of the issues to be addressed by researchers who wish to carry out the analysis of the source code of a particular executable is exactly to check whether it is packed or not.
Thus, this paper discusses the development of a tool named BinStat, which aims to, through analysis of statistics and information theory formulas, sort executables as packed or unpacked. This paper presents the following structure:
In Packing Recognition Methods, we present various packing recognition methods, including the one used in the development of the BinStat tool.
In Application Architecture, we discuss the architecture of BinStat and the implementation characteristics of each of its modules.
In Preliminary Results, we present a comparison between the statistics and information theory formulas calculated for a given executable and a packed version of the same executable.
In Results and Discussion, we analyze the results generated in the development and testing of BinStat.
Finally, follows the conclusions and references used.
II. packIng recognItIon MetHods
Some tools available for checking the packing status of binaries, such as PEiD [8] , apply the methodology of verification of packing through signatures.
If on the one hand the use of signatures not only permits the assessment of the packing status of the executables but also the tool used for that, on the other hand, the technique does not recognize the tools that are not yet available in its database of signatures as [9] and [10] show. In addition to that, recognition through signatures is subject to attempts of fraud such as the case of packing tools that mask their signature, hiding it or making it similar to other tools.
Another technique presented by [10] suggests the adoption of tracking of operations performed in memory using an emulated environment. The main idea is to control write operations performed on a given region of memory used by a process running on an emulated environment. A region of memory that was written at runtime is marked as "dirty."
To be executed, the malware original obfuscated code must undergo some kind of transformation and be written in a given memory address, that will store the original unpacked instructions, and those instructions will eventually be send to execution. Therefore, "dirty" memory regions which stores data sent for execution can contain only multi-level packing instructions or obfuscated original instructions.
The disadvantage of this methodology lies in the need to run the executable to be analyzed inside virtual machines.
Another possibility is the use of statistics and information theory formulas in order to extract information about the binary files of executables, seeking to construct a decision tree used to classify them as packed or not. This methodology was applied to this work and was also used by [11] in an attempt to identify executables with malicious behavior, showing promising results.
III. applIcatIon arcHItecture
The application is divided into four modules, as The application works in two ways. In the training phase, every single executable will be packed and both versions, the original unpacked and packed, will serve as input for the statistical module which in turn feeds the decision module, where the decision tree will be trained.
Once the tree is built, it is passed to the classification module, which in turn will then be able to receive requests for classification of executables with unknown packing status.
In the production phase, the decision module does not work. Thus, calculations generated by the statistical module about the executable to be analyzed are passed to the classification module, the result of which feeds the parser module, responsible for formatting the output in a predetermined manner convenient for further processing.
A. Statistical Module
The 
1) Simpson´s Index
Where b i refers to the ith block of the executable to be analyzed, n reaches the maximum value of the n-gram to be analyzed less one, k f is the number of occurrences of the n-gram of value f inside the block and N is the total number of bytes of the block. It is important to note that the last block of an executable to be analyzed may not have all the 1024 bytes.
2) Canberra´s Distance
Where b i refers to the ith block of the executable to be analyzed, n reaches the maximum value of the n-gram to be analyzed less one, X f refers to the frequency of the n-gram of value f, X f +1 refers to the frequency of the n-gram of value f + 1.
3) Minkowski´s Order of Distance
Where b i refers to the ith block of the executable to be analyzed, n reaches the maximum value of the n-gram to be analyzed less one, X f refers to the frequency of the n-gram of value f, X f +1 refers to the frequency of the n-gram of value f + 1. The adopted value of is 3 as defined in [11] .
4) Manhattan´s Distance
5) Chebyshev´s Distance
Where b i refers to the ith block of the executable to be analyzed, X f refers to the frequency of the n-gram of value f, X f +1 refers to the frequency of the n-gram of value f + 1.
6) Bray Curtis´s Distance
7) Angular Separation
8) Correlation Coefficient
Where b i refers to the ith block of the executable to be analyzed, n reaches the maximum value of the n-gram to be analyzed less one, X bi refers to the mean frequency of n-grams in block b i , X f refers to the frequency of the n-gram of value f, X f +1 refers to the frequency of the n-gram of value f + 1.
9) Entropy
Where Δ n represents the images, i.e., all valid values for a given n-gram and t(r v ) is the frequency of the v-value n-gram.
10) Kullback -Leibler´s Divergence
11) Jensen-Shannon´s Divergence
Where Where b i refers to the ith block of the executable to be analyzed, D refers to KullbackLeibler Divergence, X f refers to the frequency of the n-gram of value f, X f +1 refers to the frequency of the n-gram of value f + 1.
12) Itakura -Saito´s Divergence
13) Total Variation
In the training phase, for each of the n-grams (unigram up to four-gram) used this module calculates the thirteen measures presented for each block that composes the executables pertaining to the training base. This information is then passed to the decision module for the construction of a decision tree for each of the n-grams.
In the production phase, the result generated by the statistical module will be passed on to the classification module previously powered by the decision trees generated during the training phase.
B. Decision Module
To implement the decision module, applying the techniques of decision tree building, we used the public source code versions of the C5.0/See5 tools, whose operations are described in [13] .
C. Classification Module
The classification module takes as input the calculations of each of the blocks that compose the executable to be tested and the decision trees generated by the decision module. Note that one must decide which n-gram will be tested, as there is a decision tree for each of the n-grams used.
Based on these data, the module classifies each block as packed ("yes") or unpacked ("no").
D. Result Parser
The parser module receives the result generated by the decision module and formats it in order to provide a format better suited for further use.
It is important to note that this module can be adapted, enabling application integration with other mechanisms.
IV. prelIMInary results
As a pre assessment of the calculations that compose the statistical module, a specific executable (identified by the md5 e4a18adf075d 1861bd6240348a67cce2) was selected and packed with UPX packer (identified by the md5 745528339c38f3eb1790182db8febee1). The origi nal application and its packed version were used as input for this module. The distributions of normalized results (for values in the range 0 to 1) were then compared graphically: The degree of change observed in the calculations between the original and packed executables justifies their adoption as inputs for the decision tree building process.
V. results and dIscussIon
A. Training Phase
For the training phase, we selected four hundred and fifty six (456) unpacked executables: After this step, the original and packed executables are received by the statistical module, which generates the information needed for the training of the decision tree. The information is stored in a text file following the pattern of data entry adopted by the C5.0 program, as given by [13] Where each line presents -comma separated -the thirteen statistical and information theory calculations over a given block, the block status ("yes" when packed, "no" otherwise), the block id within the executable and the MD5 value of the original executable.
For the preliminary test, each of the training sets for the n-grams adopted are provided as input to C5.0, and two training options are selected. The first is the default option, and the second determines the construction of the decision tree using boost consisting of 10 steps, where the error cases of previous steps are reviewed and used as new inputs to those that follows, generating subsequent changes in the current decision tree in an attempt to improve the final decision tree´s efficiency. Based on these data, the statistics generated over the distribution of unigrams was adopted for the new training attempts with boost option with more steps: Therefore, the decision tree built over the distribution of unigrams and boost of 30 steps was adopted as input for the classification module.
Part of the adopted decision tree can be viewed in the following figure: Figure 15 . Segment of the Adopted Decision Tree
B. Production Phase
In order to test this phase, we used a set of 22 unpacked executables that do not belong to the training base of the decision tree.
In addition to the seven previously used packers, packer Themida (identified by md5 6e8ef3480f36ce538d386658b9ba011a), NakedPack (identified by md5 2012b87a57e-1b9e4c05126a1fdc6ed99) and Morphine (identified by md5 fc0c8387125ab4eaad-a551b71d274f8b) were used in the construction of sixty-six (66) packed executables in order to test the robustness of the proposed method in detecting packers which were not part of the original training set. We present below the histogram of false positives for the original unpacked executables and the histograms of false negatives for the packed executables: In the analysis of the original binaries, we see three cases of false positives in about 40 to 45% of the blocks analyzed. Still, considering the classification criteria adopted for packing -50% of blocks recognized as such -no binaries suffer misclassification.
In the analysis of binaries packed with Mew11, FSG, PECompact, Xcomp97 and Mpress, the false negative rate is lower, reaching a maximum around 37%. Again, no binaries suffered misclassification.
For binaries packed with CEXE, there is one case of misclassification out of the twenty-two analyzed, where the false negative rate reached 72.222%.
For the data generated with the usage of packers that where not in the set of packers used for the training of the BinStat application, we can see that no binary packed with NakedPack and Morphine suffered misclassification.
Finally, one can see that the binaries generated with Themida packer were easily identified as packed, with positive rates in the range of ninety-nine (99) percent.
VI. conclusIon
The paper presented a methodology for determining the packing status of executables by analyzing their binary content.
The data presented demonstrates that among the four n-grams adopted, the one that presented the best result for the construction of the decision tree was the unigram, paired with the option of algorithm boosting with 30 steps.
With these options and considering the classification criteria adopted for packaging -50% of blocks recognized as such -only one binary packed with CEXE suffered misclassification.
Additionally, all executables packed with NakedPack, Morphine and Themida where correctly classified even though those packers were not part of the training base of the BinStat application.
In the case of Themida, all binaries had more than ninety-nine (99) percent of their blocks recognized as packed, showing that this packer mechanism is easily recognized by BinStat tool.
These results demonstrate the robustness of the methodology presented in this paper.
It is noteworthy that the presented method does not use the signature technique presented on tools such as PEiD. Because of that, it is able to detect executables packed with tools that circumvents such technique.
For future work, we intend to broaden the base of training and testing with more binaries and the use of other packing tools in addition to the seven used.
In addition, we intend to investigate the impact on the methodology described of the introduction of techniques for binary processing considering some peculiarities of the PE (Portable Executable) format, before subjecting them to presented statistical module.
